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Introduction 
“The local level is where the effects will be felt and where the 
response needs to occur.” 
 –Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Guidance for Pandemic Influenza Supplemental Cooperative Agreement, 
April 8, 2006. 
 
“Coming together is a beginning. Keeping together is progress. 
Working together is success.” 
 –Henry Ford 
ince 1997, more than 200 confirmed cases of humans infected with avian 
influenza have been reported to the World Health Organization.1 More than 
one-third of those cases occurred in 2006 alone.2 Health officials around the 
globe have regarded these developments with growing concern over the 
possibility that this virus could join predecessors from 1918, 1957 and 1968 in 
changing to become transmissible within the human population. While the 1918 
Spanish Flu pandemic was by far the most deadly of the three, killing more than 40-
50 million people worldwide, the 1957 Asian Flu and the 1968 Hong Kong Flu still 
resulted in approximately 2 million and 1 million deaths, respectively, and each 
caused tens of thousands of deaths in the United States.3
S 
                                                                          
1
 See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Avian Influenza Infection in Humans webpage at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/avian-flu-humans.htm. (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
2
 See the World Health Organization Confirmed Cases of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) webpage at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2006_05_29/en/index.html (last accessed: July 
18, 2006). 
3
 See the World Health Organization Ten Things You Need to Know About Pandemic Influenza webpage at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic10things/en/ (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 Whether or not the current avian influenza ultimately changes to being transmissible 
from human to human, experts predict that it is only a matter of time before an 
influenza pandemic surfaces again. In December 2005, Congress appropriated $3.8 
billion to prepare specifically for pandemic influenza, $350 million of which was 
targeted at supporting critical efforts at the State and local levels.  
The Challenge Ahead 
When the first block of funds was released in early 2006, the guidance from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) noted that because the local 
level is the front line where a pandemic’s impact will be first felt and responded to, 
the “vast majority” of the monies should be directed to activities there.4  
If experts’ predictions about an influenza pandemic are correct, indeed the impacts 
would be striking. Such an outbreak could last as long as a year or more, with cases 
surging, then ebbing, then surging once more in six to eight-week waves. Vaccine 
for a new strain of influenza could take months to develop, and the efficacy of 
existing antiviral medications is by no means certain. Schools and public gatherings 
could be cancelled. The workforce could be depleted by up to 40 percent of its 
capacity at a time, causing not only extreme stress on the healthcare system but 
also throughout the economy, potentially causing shortages in all sectors, leaving no 
aspect of American life untouched.5    
The nation’s more than 2,400 local health departments (LHD) are leading this effort 
to plan for and minimize the anticipated devastating impact such an event would 
have in their communities. Although all emergency planning involves collaboration 
among partners to some extent, the magnitude and possible duration of a pandemic 
requires the widest involvement of agencies and individuals at the local level in 
planning for a coordinated community response to best protect the public’s health 
and ensure continuity of essential services.   
As the organization representing local health departments at the national level, the 
National Association of County and City Health Officials is providing this guide to 
assist those departments and the communities they serve in the task of writing a 
new, or improving an existing, local pandemic influenza plan. 
What this Guide IS… 
In formulating this guide, numerous local pandemic flu plans were reviewed. Many 
LHDs have been working on the challenge of pandemic influenza long before the 
                                                                          
4
 This guidance can be downloaded from the NACCHO website at: 
http://www.naccho.org/topics/infectious/emerging/avian.cfm#supplement (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
5
 See Ceci Connely, “US Plan for Flu Pandemic Revealed,” Washington Post, April 16, 2006.  Available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/15/AR2006041500901_pf.html (last accessed: July 
18, 2006).  Additional information about US government predictions for a possible influenza pandemic can be found 
at: www.pandemicflu.gov (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 recent federal government guidance and support arrived. The plans surveyed 
displayed a diversity reflective of the range of areas from which they came. In 
particular, they varied in approach, organization and level of detail. 
At the core of this guide are plans developed by local health departments that host 
two of NACCHO’s Advanced Practice Centers—cutting-edge learning laboratories 
that develop and test tools and resources that help local health departments 
continue to work on all-hazards preparedness. Santa Clara County, California and 
Seattle-King County, Washington, have both produced notably comprehensive, but 
very different, plans that describe their jurisdictions’ approaches to the threat of 
pandemic influenza. NACCHO recognizes that these two health departments are 
not necessarily representative of LHDs nationwide in terms of size and resources 
available. However, in the writing of this guide, NACCHO extracted the elements 
common to each plan, highlighting key principles and planning elements applicable 
to the full range of LHDs.  NACCHO recognizes that a one-size-fits-all approach will 
not be useful given the diversity of LHDs and the jurisdictions they serve. Individual 
local health departments can use, modify or reject the concepts and resources 
provided, depending on jurisdictional specific circumstances. 
Utilizing a detailed analysis of these plans and incorporating language and 
observations of characteristics drawn from other local plans available online6, this 
guide endeavors to offer the following: 
 An overview of key issues that should be considered for inclusion in a local 
jurisdiction’s pandemic influenza plan. 
 An examination within each issue area of questions that should be asked, 
ideas on where to find information that may be needed, and partners that 
could be consulted to address those topics within the plan. 
 Examples of ways in which other jurisdictions have addressed the topics 
described in the guide. 
 Links to information that can be used to further investigate the topics or 
resources that can be used to customize tools for individual jurisdictions. 
This guide is intended for use by local health departments as part of a multi-sector 
effort to coordinate planning and response to a pandemic influenza outbreak. 
What this Guide is NOT… 
While this guide provides a great deal of information, in order to achieve the greatest 
utility for the greatest number, there are purposeful limitations to what it attempts to 
achieve. To that end, this guide is not: 
                                                                          
6 As these plans were drawn from open source information and many contain similar and sometimes identical 
approaches to material, sources are not directly cited unless they were specifically the only document referenced for 
a certain section of this guide.  The health departments whose materials were used as supporting research for this 
document are listed after the title page of this document. 
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  A template. 
The diversity displayed among the plans that were reviewed in the preparation of 
this guide is not necessarily a weakness in the nation’s preparedness for pandemic 
influenza. Rather, with the exception of some common planning elements (see 
Chapter Two), each jurisdiction’s approach to pandemic influenza must reflect its 
own internal processes, community needs and organization. Integrating pandemic 
influenza plans within existing local plans and organizational structures is essential.  
For reference, in the appendices of this guide are the two tables of contents from the 
Public Health–Seattle King County and Santa Clara County Health Department 
plans.  While both cover many of the same core elements of pandemic influenza 
planning, their organizational styles are very different. Any jurisdiction 
reviewing/using this guide will likely find their plan will represent yet a third approach 
to this topic. 
 An instructional manual on how to write emergency plans. 
The organization of jurisdictional plans is the responsibility of each jurisdiction. Local 
areas should have existing emergency plans that pandemic influenza planning will 
need to reference and build upon. Therefore, this guide identifies common elements 
that should be considered for inclusion during pandemic influenza planning, but 
does not take a stand on whether that plan should be a hazard-specific annex to the 
overall jurisdictional emergency operations plan, whether elements of flu planning 
should be included in functional appendices to the LHD emergency plan, or any 
other permutation. 
For assistance in writing or reorganizing plans, LHDs are invited to review materials 
such as NACCHO’s BtPREP, a workbook and CD-ROM that provides guidance on 
writing bioterrorism response plans, or FEMA’s State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: 
Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning for ideas.  
 A completely comprehensive treatment of every element necessary for 
influenza planning. 
There is little doubt that planning for pandemic influenza is a dauntingly complex 
endeavor. While this guide provides a jumping off point for a number of subjects that 
are components of pandemic influenza planning, addressing any of the topics 
comprehensively would require such a level of detail as to defeat the overall goal of 
this document. Likewise, in many cases there are other dedicated resources that do 
explore those topics in much greater detail. Whenever possible, those documents 
will be referenced in the appropriate sections. 
Ready. Set. Plan.
In order to use this guide most effectively, NACCHO suggests that the following 
actions are taken prior to embarking upon the pandemic influenza planning process 
or making major additions/deletions to an existing plan: 
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  Gather a copy of all jurisdiction emergency operations plans to 
review, cross-reference and integrate, whenever possible. There is no 
reason to write a new section on public information in a pandemic 
influenza plan, for example, if the bones of the system are established in 
the jurisdiction’s emergency operations plan. This prevents both 
duplication of effort and the unfortunate possibility of two plans in the same 
jurisdiction contradicting one another. Pandemic influenza planning should 
focus on what is different about this type of emergency that will require a 
response unlike that needed for other hazards the jurisdiction may have 
planned for in the past. 
 Identify community partners that will be critical to the development and 
execution of pandemic influenza plans. In addition to being required by 
CDC to obtain the initial influenza preparedness funding,7 a 
multidisciplinary planning committee is key to addressing the uniquely 
daunting scale of a pandemic. This local committee should feature 
representatives of not only traditional response partners, but also other 
local governmental agencies less commonly consulted (public works, 
sanitation), private partners (local businesses, volunteer organizations), 
and local associations (medical societies, chambers of commerce) who 
may identify unforeseen challenges and devise solutions that would 
otherwise remain undiscovered.8 Engagement of community members 
could also help to determine how people’s actions in a crisis might differ 
from assumptions made during planning.9 Ultimately, while the public 
health response in the face of a pandemic will be critical, the 
corresponding response mounted by non-traditional partners will be crucial 
given the anticipated human toll and impact on a community’s essential 
services. 
 Learn about pandemic influenza and be prepared to educate the 
planning committee and ultimately, the broader community about the 
anticipated extended duration of a pandemic, likely shortages in medical 
treatment, widespread human impact; and the resulting challenges to the 
maintenance of essential community services.10 The more that community 
                                                                          
7
 This guidance can be downloaded from the NACCHO website at: 
http://www.naccho.org/topics/infectious/emerging/avian.cfm#supplement (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
8
 Some resources with tips on engaging specific partner communities include: Montgomery County, Maryland’s tip 
sheets on How to Create a Partnership Between Your Public Health Agency and the Child Care Community at: 
http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=269  and How to Create a Partnership Between Your Public Health 
Agency and Area Hospitals at: http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=270.   
9
 See the Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health’s 2004 report, Redefining Readiness: 
Terrorism Planning through the Eyes of the Public at http://www.cacsh.org/eptpp.html. (last accessed: July 18, 2006) 
10
 Numerous states and localities have already generated PowerPoint presentations to communicate this 
information.  Some examples are: Virginia Department of Health at 
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/bt/Secure%20VA.%20Subpanel%20Meeting%2011.13.02/1_DHawkins,%20Pandemic%
20Influenza,%20for%20JHilbert.ppt (last accessed: July 18, 2006);  Larimer County, Colorado at 
http://www.larimer.org/health/cd/dec5meeting.ppt (last accessed: July 18, 2006); Seattle-King County Public Health 
at http://www.metrokc.gov/health/pandemicflu/multimedia/051806-presentation.ppt (last accessed: July 18, 2006); 
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 partners and residents not normally a part of such activities can be made 
to understand the rationales behind pandemic planning, and the critical 
roles that they can play in mitigation and response as the outbreak 
unfolds, the easier it will be to elicit their participation and cooperation. 
Given the anticipated impacts, local health departments cannot plan alone for 
pandemic influenza.  While the nature of the challenge places the LHD at the 
center of responsibility for identifying the Key Actions of a plan, coordinated 
efforts with partners at all levels will be required to best protect the public's 
health during a pandemic. If the task of trying to assemble the right entities in 
your community in planning is encountering resistance, try a different tack. 
Think about whether existing committees or groups in the community might 
include the right mix (or close to it) of individuals to do this work and ask to 
have a regular place on their agenda. Work with the leadership in your 
jurisdiction. Get the support of your emergency manager. Talk to your State 
health department for ideas.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Dallas County, Texas at 
http://www.dallascounty.org/department/hhservices/services/publichealthalert/documents/generictalk.pdf (last 
accessed: June 30, 20006); and Multnomah County, Oregon at 
http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/health/presentations/board_briefing_040506.ppt (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 Chapter 
2
Overarching Planning Elements  
“The greater part of all mischief in the world arises from the fact 
that men do not sufficiently understand their own aims. They 
have undertaken to build a tower, and spend no more labor on 
the foundation than would be necessary to erect a hut.” 
--John Wolfgang von Goethe 
  
efore a plan can define and assign specific tasks for preparing and 
responding to an emergency such as pandemic influenza, it must first 
establish the foundation on which this planning is based. The initial common 
planning elements provide the “big picture,” the context within which the specific 
tasks will be carried out. What does the plan seek to accomplish? What facts does it 
assume will be true if the emergency described were to take place? How much of 
the preparation and response is the plan intended to capture?  What theoretical and 
organizational elements will be used to provide the structure of the plan? Inclusion of 
these aspects in a local plan should be in keeping with the style and organization of 
the other jurisdictional emergency planning documents that it references and 
complements. Therefore, while sample language is provided below for some of 
these key actions, each jurisdiction must make its decisions on what to include 
based on its own circumstances and needs.  
 B
Purposes and Goals 
What exactly does the jurisdictional plan aim to accomplish? Articulating the central 
purposes of the plan and its goals can help to clarify the planning process for all 
involved. 
Some examples of this kind of language: 
This pandemic influenza plan has three main purposes. The plan 
will: 
1. serve as a planning guide for the health department and 
other county departments/agencies; 
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 2. provide guidance and tools to the many partners in the 
community who will be involved in the response; and, 
3. guide activities to educate and prepare the general public 
regarding this public health threat. 
 
Ultimately, when implemented, this plan is intended to achieve the 
following goals: 
1. Limit the number of illnesses and deaths. 
2. Preserve continuity of essential government functions. 
3. Minimize social disruption. 
4. Minimize economic losses. 
Defining Scope 
Clearly articulating where a plan begins and ends is important in order for those 
involved in a response to know how to properly utilize it. In particular, it is essential to 
clearly demarcate what is not included in a plan because it exists elsewhere in 
another local or state planning document.  
As a plan attempts to define its operational/definitional boundaries, some questions 
to consider include: 
 Where does this pandemic influenza plan fit into, and how does it link to, other 
emergency plans in the jurisdiction?  
 Does it address only the role of the LHD in the event of pandemic influenza 
while generically mentioning other local elements of the local response that 
are covered elsewhere? Or does it take a comprehensive approach and 
describe the overall jurisdictional approach to pandemic influenza and outline 
key roles and responsibilities of all response partners?  
 Lastly, what doesn’t the plan include that some might expect to be there? Be 
sure to state this clearly. Often what isn’t in a plan is as notable as what is. 
Seattle-King County’s Plan provides the following scope for its plan: 
The Plan is an annex to Emergency Support Function 8 (Health and 
Medical Services) of the Regional Disaster Plan. Emergency Support 
Function 8 and its annexes are referenced in the Plan as they provide a 
broad description of the responsibilities, authorities and actions 
associated with public health emergencies. 
The Plan primarily focuses on the roles, responsibilities, and activities 
of Public Health-Seattle King County (PHSKC). However, specific 
responsibilities for key response partners are included to highlight 
points of coordination between agencies during a pandemic. It is 
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 expected that health care facilities and health care professionals, 
essential service providers, local governmental officials and business 
leaders will develop and incorporate procedures and protocols 
addressing influenza preparedness and response activities into their 
emergency response plans. 
The Plan currently does not address measures that would be taken to 
contain an outbreak of the avian influenza virus in birds or other animal 
populations occurring in King County. Federal and State departments 
of agriculture are primarily responsible for surveillance and control of 
influenza outbreaks in domestic animals, although agricultural control 
measures interface with public health actions to prevent transmission 
into humans. PHSKC will develop an annex to this plan that will identify 
the roles and responsibilities of local, State, and Federal agencies in 
response to an avian influenza threat to King County. 
Santa Clara County addresses similar concepts, but includes specific roles, 
responsibilities and tasks for community entities beyond the LHD and specifically 
references the interface between its pandemic influenza planning effort with specific 
annexes to the current departmental emergency operations plan: 
The scope of the Pandemic Flu Plan includes actions defined in each of 
the plans mentioned below, but makes them operational and specific to 
the pandemic flu context. Pandemic flu response efforts will likely 
trigger the activation of plans external to the (Santa Clara County Public 
Health Department), including the hospital’s infection control and surge 
capacity plans, business continuity of operations plans, government 
continuity of operations plans, etc. 
The Pandemic Flu Plan is an annex to the Santa Clara County Public 
Health Department Emergency Operations Plan (Volume 2, Annex G). 
The Pandemic Flu Plan will be implemented in tandem with the 
Emergency Operations Plan. Several portions of the existing 
Emergency Operations Plan are particularly relevant to pandemic flu 
response. These include: 
1. Risk Communication Plan (Volume 1, Annex C) 
2. Disease Surveillance and Disease Outbreak Investigation (Volume 2) 
3. Strategic National Stockpile Plan (Volume 2, Annex D) 
4. Mass Prophylaxis Plan (Volume 2, Annex E) 
5. Isolation and Quarantine Plan (Volume 2, Annex F) 
6. Mass Fatality Plan (Volume 2, to be developed) 
The section containing the scope may be as long or short, as detailed or concise as 
needed, to express the extent of what a user can expect to find within the document. 
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 Planning Assumptions 
Emergency plans or annexes specifically targeting a hazard often begin with a set of 
planning assumptions that set the parameters of the plan. In NACCHO’s non-
systematic survey of existing and available local pandemic flu plans, this component 
was frequently a part of the introductory material. These planning sections did not 
match each other verbatim, necessarily, but many contained variations on the 
following points as taken from the Santa Clara County, California, and Seattle-King 
County, Washington plans. 
1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of infection with 
outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and the 
country may be impacted simultaneously. 
2. Localities will not be able to rely on timely or effective mutual aid 
resources, State or Federal assistance to support local response 
efforts.   
3. An influenza pandemic may occur in waves and last for 12 to 24 
months.  
4. Residents will be required to stay in their homes for a significant 
period during an influenza pandemic; thus, residents will need public 
information, education and tools so they are prepared to take 
responsibility for basic needs (food, water, prescription meds, over-the-
counter medications, etc.).  
5. Antiviral medications will be in extremely short supply. 
Administration of local supplies of antiviral medications will be 
prioritized by ______________ in accordance with ________________. 
(Examples of specific language can be found in the footnote.)11
6. A vaccine for the pandemic influenza strain will likely not be available 
for 6 to 8 months following the emergence of a novel virus.   
7. The number of ill people requiring outpatient medical care and 
hospitalization will overwhelm the local health care system. In other 
words, the normal amount and level of hospital care will not be 
available.  
a. Hospitals and clinics will have to modify their operational 
structure to respond to high patient volumes and maintain 
functionality of critical systems.  
                                                                          
11
 Seattle-King County’s version of this assumption reads “Antiviral medications will be in extremely short supply.  
Local supplies of antiviral medications may be prioritized by (Public Health-Seattle King County) for use in 
hospitalized influenza patients, health care workers providing care for patients and other priority groups based on 
current national guidelines and in consultation with the Washington Department of Health.” 
Santa Clara County’s version of this assumption reads “Antiviral medications will be in extremely short supply.  
Administration of local supplies of antiviral medications will be prioritized by the Santa Clara County Public Health 
Department.” 
  12 
 b. The health care system will have to respond to increased 
demands for service while the medical workforce experiences 
25-35% absenteeism due to illness or caring for ill family 
members.  
c. Demand for inpatient beds and assisted ventilators could 
increase by ten-fold or more and patients will need to be 
prioritized for services.  
d. There will be tremendous demand for urgent care services.  
e. Infection control measures specific to management of 
influenza patients will need to be developed and implemented at 
health care facilities, out-patient care settings and long-term care 
facilities.  
f. The health system will need to develop alternative care sites to 
relieve demand on hospital emergency departments and care for 
persons not ill enough to merit hospitalization but who cannot be 
cared for at home.  
g. Emergency Medical Service responders will face extremely 
high call volumes, and may face 25% - 35% reduction in available 
staff.  
h. The number of fatalities will overwhelm the resources of the 
Medical Examiner’s Office, morgues and funeral homes.  
i. The demand for home care and social services will increase 
dramatically.  
8. There will likely be significant disruption of public and privately 
owned critical infrastructure including transportation, commerce, 
utilities, public safety and communications.  
9. Social distancing strategies aimed at reducing the spread of infection 
such as closing schools, community centers, and other public 
gathering points and canceling public events will likely be implemented 
during a pandemic.  
10. Some persons will be unable or unwilling to comply with isolation 
directives. For others, social distancing strategies may be less feasible 
(for example, homeless populations who live in congregate settings). It 
will be important to develop and disseminate strategies for infection 
control appropriate for these environments and populations. 
11. Risk Communication will be critically important during all phases of 
planning and implementation of a pandemic influenza response. The 
general public, health care system, response agencies, and elected 
leaders will need continuous updates on the status of the pandemic 
outbreak, impacts on critical services, the steps being taken to address 
the incident, and steps the public can take to protect themselves. 
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 While there are some jurisdictionally specific details within these assumptions, the 
basic concepts provide a solid universal overview of the challenges that pandemic 
influenza planning must address. The actual impact in any given jurisdiction will 
vary, but the Centers for Disease Control and the Department of Homeland Security 
have each provided estimates (see Table A) that could be used to generate 
numbers for communities. 
Table A: Impacts of a Pandemic12  
Casualties 
DHS: 15% attack rate: 87,000 fatalities; 300,000 
hospitalizations 
DHS: 35% attack rate: 207,000 fatalities; 733,800 
hospitalizations 
CDC: moderate 89,000 fatalities 
CDC: severe: 207,000 fatalities 
HHS: Moderate: 209,000 fatalities; 865,000 hospitalizations 
HHS: Severe: 1,903,000 fatalities; 9,900,000 hospitalizations 
None Infrastructure Damage 
Contamination None 
Economic Impact 
DHS: $70 to $200 billion 
CDC: $71 to $166 billion 
HHS: up to $450 billion 
Yes, would be nearly worldwide, with successive waves at 
intervals of months over several years 
Potential for Multiple 
Events 
 
Phases of a Pandemic 
Perhaps the most critical information specific to pandemic influenza planning are the 
phases of a pandemic as characterized by the World Health Organization (see 
Table B). The majority of local pandemic plans surveyed for this guide (as well as 
federal and state plans as well) used these phases to designate how activities would 
expand and evolve when a phase change was announced. This format allows for 
the explicit description of how different actions will need to take place during the 
                                                                          
12
 As summarized on GlobalSecurity.org at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-scen-3.htm. (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006) 
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 different stages, performed by different community partners. As steps are taken 
throughout the evolution of a possible pandemic, jurisdictional entities involved in 
mitigation can act and prepare (through public information campaigns, activation of 
surveillance, and logistical preparation) before an actual response begins. 
Approaching planning in phases provides a useful framework not only for the plan 
but also in gradually working through the myriad issues involved in this daunting 
task. These phases will be addressed again in the issue-specific planning sections 
provided in Chapter Three.  
 
Table B: Phases of a Pandemic13  
Phase  Public Health Goals  
Interpandemic Period  
Phase 1 – No new influenza virus 
subtypes in humans. A subtype that has 
caused human infection may be present in 
animals. Risk of human infection is 
considered low.  
Strengthen influenza pandemic 
preparedness at all levels. Closely monitor 
human and animal surveillance data.  
Phase 2 - No new influenza virus subtypes 
in humans. However, circulating animal 
influenza virus subtype poses substantial 
risk of human disease.  
Minimize the risk of transmission of animal 
influenza virus to humans; detect and 
report such transmission rapidly if it occurs.  
Pandemic Alert Period  
Phase 3 - Human infection(s) with a new 
subtype, no human-to-human spread or 
rare instances of spread.  
Ensure rapid characterization of the new 
virus subtype and early detection, 
notification and response to additional 
cases.  
Phase 4 - Small cluster(s) with limited 
human-to-human transmission. Spread 
highly localized.  
Contain the new virus within limited foci or 
delay spread to gain time to implement 
preparedness measures, including vaccine 
development.  
Phase 5 - Larger cluster(s) but human-to-
human spread still localized, suggesting 
that the virus is becoming increasingly 
better adapted to humans, but may not yet 
be fully transmissible (substantial 
pandemic risk).  
Maximize efforts to contain or delay spread 
to possibly avert a pandemic, and to gain 
time to implement response measures.  
                                                                          
13
 As determined by the World Health Organization.  For a simplified list and to check which phase the situation is 
currently at, see WHO’s Current WHO Phase of Pandemic Alert at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/index.html (last accessed: July 18, 2006).  
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 Pandemic  
Phase 6 – Pandemic: increased and 
sustained transmission in general 
population.  
Implement response measures including 
social distancing to minimize pandemic 
impacts.  
 
Who Has the Authority? 
Many of the actions that may be warranted during a pandemic influenza will require 
legal authority—most notably, enacting isolation and/or quarantine. In any 
jurisdiction, the various authorities that protect public health and safety will likely lie 
with a number of different elected and appointed officials who will need to work 
together in an emergency situation to mount a swift response. Plans that detail what 
officials or agencies possess which authority under what state or local codes can 
help to prevent missteps, oversteps and/or conflicts during an emergency. 
Sometimes this information is already detailed in other emergency operations or 
public health emergency plans and can simply be referenced, e.g. “Authorities: See 
Page 7 of the Katano County Emergency Operations Plan.” If not, this information 
could be a valuable inclusion in the pandemic influenza plan. 
Santa Clara County and Seattle-King County take different approaches to 
presenting this information. Santa Clara County’s plan takes a functional approach, 
enumerating different tasks and then describing who possesses which authorities 
critical to accomplishing those actions. Seattle-King County, on the other hand, 
begins with the governor of Washington and proceeds through different State and 
local officials, concluding with the local health officer, describing for each what 
authority they possess under what statutes that may be relevant in a pandemic 
response. Either approach accomplishes the aim and being able to access the 
information both ways may be ideal.  
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
As noted in the previous chapter, effective emergency planning must reflect and 
address the specific circumstances and environment of the jurisdiction for which the 
planning is taking place. However, by definition, pandemic influenza will affect many 
jurisdictions simultaneously. In an emergency, communities will benefit from sharing 
a standardized set of terminology and employing a uniform system of response. 
Since its creation in 2002, the Department of Homeland Security has been 
developing a multi-faceted system that attempts to encourage this type of 
standardization, guided by Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5 and 8.14 
                                                                          
14
 To read these documents, see the White House’s HSPD-5 webpage at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html   and the HSPD-8 webpage at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html (last accessed: July 18, 2006).   
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 Some of these federal initiatives will have an impact on local pandemic influenza 
planning. 
At this point, most governmental agencies involved in emergency response in each 
local jurisdiction are working to become compliant with the country’s National 
Incident Management System (NIMS). Currently, the largest component of this 
system that must be addressed at an operational level is the training and 
institutionalization of the Incident Command System (ICS) as the sole means of 
organizing an emergency response in every community in the United States. While 
this may strike some as rigid, the flexibility of ICS is one of the central reasons that it 
has been adopted by so many different types of agencies to manage the response 
to emergency events even prior to the government requirement. Training materials 
for ICS can be found online at the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
(FEMA) Emergency Management Institute Independent Study website. NACCHO 
has released an ICS course specifically for public health personnel that can be 
purchased online. Other places to contact for training include your local and State 
emergency management and State health departments. 
How can NIMS and ICS be integrated into pandemic influenza planning? The fact is, 
utilizing NIMS and ICS within any kind of jurisdictional emergency response should 
be a part of the larger local emergency operations plan. Where it is logical to refer to 
specific elements (e.g. convening of a joint information center), plans certainly can 
and should. However, if there is no particular part of the plan where it is appropriate 
to do so, a statement of intent can be included, such as “All pandemic influenza 
response activities will be conducted within an incident command structure and 
consistent with the National Incident Management System.” Each jurisdiction then 
has the responsibility to ensure that intent is met by conducting regular training and 
exercises.  
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 Chapter 
3
 
Key Issue Areas in Pandemic 
Influenza Planning 
“Plans are only good intentions unless they immediately 
degenerate into hard work.” 
 –Peter F. Drucker 
 
he following pages contain a wealth of information drawn from the analysis of 
a range of actual local health department plans and planning guidance. 
NACCHO has attempted to identify key planning and response elements for 
each of the issue areas. These overviews are meant to spur planning conversations 
in jurisdictional multidisciplinary planning committees. The final content and detail of 
your plan will inevitably differ from what is presented given the unique resources, 
qualities and organization of your jurisdiction and existing emergency operations 
plans. 
 T
Key to Issue Area Sections 
 
Issue Area: This will be the broad topic area to be discussed. 
Description: Because there are many aspects to a topic as complex as “Public 
Information and Risk Communication,” for example, the description will endeavor to 
give a broad overview of what is included in the topic area and why it is important to 
pandemic influenza planning. 
Relevant Planning Assumptions (examples): In Chapter Two, this guide 
discussed the importance of clearly laying out assumptions upon which the plan is 
based and provided some examples of such assumptions in the context of 
pandemic influenza. Drawing from those examples, each worksheet will cite some of 
the assumptions that may be most relevant to planning in that area. 
Key Partners: Each worksheet will offer some suggestions of what community 
partners (not those at the State or federal levels) may be instrumental in solving the 
challenges in the topic area. Some of these will be obvious, others may be less so. 
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 Likewise, some of these entities will not exist in some communities, while other 
communities may find necessary partners not mentioned. Remember that these 
sections are a tool to jumpstart the planning process, not to address every issue 
comprehensively for every jurisdiction. 
Key Actions by Phase (examples): This section will provide some examples of 
tasks that select jurisdictions have chosen to include in their plans. The section will 
follow the organization that many jurisdictions have adopted, based upon the phases 
of a pandemic, as discussed in Chapter Two. These elements are neither 
comprehensive nor conclusive. Some jurisdictions may decide to conduct 
certain tasks in an earlier or later phase, or not at all. Again, these elements 
are offered as examples of items to include within a plan. 
Questions for Consideration: Some additional questions have been identified that 
may help in the effort to plan for each topic area, along with suggestions on who to 
consult for answers. 
Tools and Resources: This guide attempts to link to some of the many materials 
that various entities and local health departments have created that other agencies 
may be able to reference or utilize.15 If you have suggestions for materials that you 
have encountered that could benefit other local health departments, email NACCHO 
at get_tools@naccho.org with a description, contact information, attachments and/or 
a link. 
Final Thoughts on Developing Your Plan 
 Some ideas for moving forward on the planning process: 
 Some questions and suggestions may not apply to your jurisdiction. Dismiss 
them and move on, understanding that they are there because they may 
apply to others. 
 Because of the complexity of pandemic influenza planning, the tasks 
included in these worksheets actually describe making additional plans to 
address certain subtopics. These additional plans typically address very 
specific activities. They may need to be developed as a part of the overall 
influenza planning process in the jurisdiction or they may be addressed 
through existing emergency plans. 
 Tasks listed in one phase may carry through to future phases, but are not 
relisted. 
 Many of the suggested tasks in the following worksheets are not the purview 
of health departments alone. Others in the community will need to assume 
responsibilities for pandemic influenza preparedness and response activities 
that are in their domain. 
                                                                          
15 This guide does not provide specific, individual links to the many planning documents available on the federal 
pandemic influenza site, www.pandemicflu.gov (last accessed: July 18, 2006).  
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  Designation of the parties responsible for tasks within the plan is imperative 
in order to make sure that everyone understands their roles and 
responsibilities when a pandemic unfolds. 
 Communicate the plan’s expectations of other agencies, groups and private 
entities that may not be present during initial planning efforts and make sure 
they know what you anticipate they will provide. For example, are you 
counting on the State to provide an informational hotline for the public? What 
does the State plan say?  
 Be honest about where breaking points are and talk through how those will 
play out. If emergency managers are tasked with finding additional supplies, 
they need to be able to provide examples of whom they would consult. If 
certain supplies are unavailable for a period of time, how will that impact the 
response? What can be done? 
 Depending on the scope and assumptions that the plan is based on and the 
needs and size of the community, writing a plan for a disaster on the scale of 
a pandemic may be a truly long term endeavor. Make sure that any workplan 
acknowledges that at the local level, all involved have other projects and 
efforts clamoring for their time. Frankly address the balance that needs to be 
struck between the real threat of a pandemic and the day-to-day pressures 
that all players face. 
 Finally, maintaining that plan with the cooperation of partners is also a long 
term commitment. Writing an initial draft of a plan is a first step. Exercising 
and testing out that plan, identifying gaps, and creating strategies to improve 
the plan based upon those experiences is a cycle that must be sustained 
over time in order to keep plans so diligently created relevant and up to date. 
NACCHO hopes this information provides a jumping off point for your efforts, or a 
framework through which to consider and improve your current plans.  
  20 
 Issue Area: Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation 
 
Description:  During a pandemic, early identification of the initial outbreak will be 
key to activating other aspects of the plan in a timely fashion to best contain the 
spread of the disease. This may be accomplished in many different ways—from 
computer-based, real-time syndromic surveillance systems to hospital, laboratory, 
and mortality surveillance to disease reporting conducted by astute clinicians.  
Epidemiological investigations will provide vital information about both the potential 
spread of disease, with contact tracing identifying the most high-risk individuals who 
may require quarantine. Health departments without robust internal epidemiological 
capacity should consult with their State agencies to determine how such 
investigations will be conducted in the face of a pandemic.  
Interactions with laboratories must be conducted according to clearly defined 
protocols, as these vital components to the pandemic influenza response will be 
taxed beyond their capacities regardless. Communication about what to expect in 
terms of prioritization of samples and turn-around times in the event of a 40% 
decrease in workforce or a shortage of reagents will enhance realistic planning. 
Likewise, laboratories should, when possible, be included in some manner in 
pandemic influenza exercises. 
 
 
Relevant Planning Assumptions (examples): 
1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of infection with 
outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and 
the country may be impacted simultaneously. 
2. An influenza pandemic may occur in waves and last for 12 to 24 
months. 
3. There will likely be significant disruption of public and privately 
owned critical infrastructure including transportation, commerce, 
utilities, public safety and communications. 
4. There will likely be significant disruption of public and privately 
owned critical infrastructure including transportation, commerce, 
utilities, public safety and communications. 
5. Social distancing strategies aimed at reducing the spread of 
infection such as closing schools, community centers, and other 
public gathering points and canceling public events will likely be 
implemented during a pandemic. 
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 Key Partners: Hospitals; Public Health and Clinical Laboratories, Medical Examiner/ 
Coroner’s Office; Community Health Centers; Long Term Care Facilities; Private 
Physicians; Pharmacies; Schools; Airports; Ports; Businesses with Large Campuses  
Key Actions by Phase (examples): 
Phases 1 and 2:  
 Operate ongoing syndromic surveillance systems within the jurisdiction.  
 Request regular reporting of unexplained deaths by the medical examiner or 
coroner’s offices. 
 Request absenteeism reports from schools, long term care facilities, or other 
entities within the community 
 Ensure partners have appropriate data collecting tools. 
 Ensure community clinician contact information is current for formats by which 
local health department will want to communicate in the event of an 
emergency. 
 
Phase 3:  
 Enact enhanced surveillance efforts. 
 Expand surveillance to community entities such as schools, long term care 
facilities and military installations. 
 Coordinate efforts with other local, state and federal entities.  
 Expand seasonal influenza surveillance year round. 
 Cross-train staff. 
 Review surge capacity plans. 
 Develop any additional data requests (travel, etc) to be integrated into health 
care information collection efforts. 
 
Phase 4:  
 Activate processes to track any possible cases identified in jurisdiction. 
 Establish case definition in concert with the HHS, CDC, and the state health 
department. 
 Disseminate surveillance guidelines to physicians, clinics and hospitals. 
 Monitor local media and news sources for information related to pandemic 
influenza activity and forward that information to designated personnel. 
 
Phase 5:  
 Develop and/or refine protocol for active surveillance at hospitals and other 
facilities. 
 Provide physicians and other primary care sites with instructions about 
gathering samples from individuals who display symptoms of influenza-like 
illness (ILI) and who are at increased risk for infection according to 
established guidelines. 
 Investigate outbreaks of ILI in schools and at other community gathering 
spots. 
 Conduct epidemiological investigations and contact monitoring among any 
cases in the jurisdiction. 
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  Disseminate information regarding status of outbreak to all health care 
providers and other facilities at regular intervals. 
 Monitor workforce absenteeism within the community through reporting from 
major employers. 
 
Phase 6:  
 Screen and/or quarantine international travelers recently arriving in the 
jurisdiction from an area known and/or suspected to be infected (referencing 
any federal guidelines). 
 Monitor workforce absenteeism within the community through reporting from 
major employers. 
 Review surveillance data for potential risk factors that either prioritize or 
deprioritize infected individuals for receiving antivirals and/or vaccine. 
 Set up unpublished call-in line for healthcare professionals to answer 
questions.  
 
Questions for Consideration:
Is surveillance the purview of the local jurisdiction or of the State? Does the 
jurisdiction conduct routine seasonal influenza surveillance? What changes, if any, 
would need to be instituted to expand routine flu surveillance practices during each 
of the pandemic phases? How/when would partners expect to receive information 
about enhanced surveillance guidelines? 
Are there any other sources from which it would be helpful to gather surveillance 
information? For example, are there major businesses in the community who have 
medical services on their campuses that would volunteer to monitor and report 
absentee rates? 
Does the LHD possess sufficient staffing to handle a surge in analysis of incoming 
disease reporting? Where might additional personnel to assist in these efforts be 
located? Are there just-in-time training materials that could be developed in the 
earlier pandemic phases to address this issue?  
Does the LHD possess sufficient staffing to handle a surge in outbreak 
investigation? Will epidemiological staff from State health departments that typically 
assist with local investigations be available to augment local efforts during a 
pandemic or will they be working at the state level?  
If staffing is insufficient to handle all incoming disease reports or epidemiological 
investigations, how will efforts be prioritized?  
Are all members of the epidemiological and laboratory staff prepared to don 
appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) during an event? Where would 
information regarding appropriate levels of PPE be generated and how would it be 
provided to staff? What supplies will be needed and who will be responsible for 
obtaining them if a pandemic occurs?  If there are insufficient amounts of PPE, how 
will prioritization take place? 
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 Would the jurisdiction begin to engage in systematically tracking travel of sick 
individuals during any of the phases? When would partners be notified about asking 
such questions and how would information be conveyed back through disease 
reporting channels? 
How does submission of samples to laboratories change during each of the 
pandemic phases? How will updated information on routing and notification be 
conveyed to health care facilities as the phases progress? 
Tools and Resources: 
Weekly Epidemiological Record from the World Health Organization, dated June 
30, 2006, available at http://www.who.int/entity/wer/wer8126.pdf (last accessed: July 
18, 2006). “This week’s issue …sets out results from the first analysis of 
epidemiological data on all 205 laboratory-confirmed H5N1 cases officially 
reported to WHO by onset date from December 2003 to 30 April 2006.” 
Information about the National Retail Data Monitor, a service that monitors sales of 
over-the-counter (OTC) healthcare products to identify disease outbreaks as early 
as possible, can be found at http://rods.health.pitt.edu/NRDM.htm (last accessed: 
July 18, 2006).  The program is available free of charge to public health officials for 
the purposes of surveillance. 
Gani R, Hughes H, Fleming D, Griffin T, Medlock J, Leach S. “Potential Impact of 
Antiviral Drug Use During Influenza Pandemic” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 
September 2005. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no09/04-
1344.htm (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Laboratory information from the Health and Human Services Pandemic 
Influenza Plan Supplement 2, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup2.html (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Includes biosafety guidelines, guidelines for collecting and shipping samples, and 
interim enhanced surveillance and diagnostic evaluation for identifying human cases 
of H5N1.  
 “Influenza 2005: The Laboratory's Role in Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response” CDC webcast, conducted on December 6, 2005 with materials available 
at http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/nltn/NPHTCS/influenzae120605.aspx (last accessed: 
July 18, 2006). 
Notice and Order to Appear for Medical Examination, developed by Santa Clara 
County Health Department, available at 
http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=324 (last accessed: July 18, 2006).   
Sample Suspect Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Specimen Submittal Form, 
developed by Santa Clara County Health Department, available at 
http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=323 (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 Issue Area: Public/Partner Education & Risk Communication
 
Description:   “Dissemination and sharing of timely and accurate information with 
the health care community, the media, and the general public will be one of the most 
important facets of the pandemic response. Advising the public in actions they can 
take to minimize their risk of exposure or actions to take if they have been exposed, 
will reduce the spread of the pandemic and may also serve to reduce panic and 
unnecessary demands on vital services.”16
Because a pandemic situation will, by its very nature, overwhelm all the resources 
that both the governmental and private sectors can bring to bear, citizens must be 
encouraged to be as self-sufficient as possible during the outbreak, before it hits. 
Such messaging may include how to best contain the disease through lessons like 
“cover your cough” or stress that in a pandemic, home health care of loved ones 
may be the more healthy choice.  
 
Relevant Planning Assumptions (examples): 
1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of infection with 
outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and the 
country may be impacted simultaneously. 
2. An influenza pandemic may occur in waves and last for 12 to 24 
months.  
3. Residents will be required to stay in their homes for a significant period 
during an influenza pandemic; thus, residents will need public 
information, education and tools so they are prepared to take 
responsibility for basic needs (food, water, prescription meds, over-the-
counter medications, etc.). 
4. Antiviral medications will be in extremely short supply. 
5. A vaccine for the pandemic influenza strain will likely not be available 
for 6 to 8 months following the emergence of a novel virus.   
6. There will likely be significant disruption of public and privately owned 
critical infrastructure including transportation, commerce, utilities, public 
safety and communications.  
7. Social distancing strategies aimed at reducing the spread of infection 
such as closing schools, community centers, and other public gathering 
                                                                          
16
 Tacoma Pierce County Health Department Pandemic Flu Plan, Revision 0.  Available online at 
http://www.tpchd.org/files/library/72ca976ea6db69b9.pdf  (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 points and canceling public events will likely be implemented during a 
pandemic.  
8. Some persons will be unable or unwilling to comply with isolation 
directives. For others, social distancing strategies may be less feasible 
(for example, homeless populations who live in congregate settings). It 
will be important to develop and disseminate strategies for infection 
control appropriate for these environments and populations. 
9. Risk Communication will be critically important during all phases of 
planning and implementation of a pandemic influenza response. The 
general public, health care system, response agencies, and elected 
leaders will need continuous updates on the status of the pandemic 
outbreak, impacts on critical services, the steps being taken to address 
the incident, and steps the public can take to protect themselves. 
Key Partners: Hospitals; Emergency Management; 911 Dispatch, Mayor’s Office; 
Schools, Private Businesses; Red Cross; Community Service Organizations 
(Rotary, Kiwanis, etc); Local Media  
Key Actions by Phase (examples): 
When addressing public education and risk communication, most local pandemic 
influenza plans reference other emergency planning documents for the basics on 
who will oversee the efforts, how a Joint Information Center or other such 
collaborative effort will be convened, and the various methods by which information 
will be disseminated during an emergency.  
Phases 1 through 3: 
 Educate the community about the potential for an influenza pandemic, with a 
focus on the role that individuals must play in taking care of themselves and 
their families.  
 Communicate with partners about their role in a pandemic and what they 
might need to do to protect themselves and their families. 
 Educate physicians on pandemics and what they may expect in terms of 
clinical disease, surveillance and vaccination recommendations and the use 
of viral agents. 
 Educate local pharmacists on pandemics and their role. 
 Educate local businesses regarding pandemic influenza and the need for 
continuity of operations plans. 
 Develop materials in advance that can be quickly disseminated when an 
outbreak takes place with details on how to prevent against getting sick (cover 
that cough, wash hands), when to stay home and when to come to the 
hospital, how to get information about the situation, how to care for loved 
ones, etc.  
 Ensure that all materials developed in advance are available in the dominant 
languages of the jurisdiction. 
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  Work with community and faith-based organizations to reach populations that 
may not access materials offered through traditional channels. 
 Designate official spokesperson in the event of pandemic. 
 
Phase 4:  
 Distribute information developed in advance. 
 Request that State health department set up public information hotline. 
 Develop scripts for public information hotline based on federal and State 
guidelines. 
 Consider activation of a Joint Information Center (JIC). 
 Develop press releases drawing on federal and State information but tailored 
to local needs through inclusion of local phone numbers, websites, and 
healthcare information. 
 Regularly update local websites with any developing information. 
 Develop message map for communicating key talking points. 
 
Phase 5: 
 Participate in briefings with experts at CDC and the State department of 
health. 
 Conduct briefings with emergency departments, infection control practitioners, 
and community providers providing identification criteria, laboratory testing 
protocols, case definition, diagnostic and treatment protocols, as relevant. 
 Provide daily public briefings and regular media briefings on the status of the 
outbreak. 
 Reassign public health staff to support flu-related services. 
 
Phase 6: 
 Establish a JIC. 
 Update message maps as needed. 
 Continue regular updates of the public of the status of the outbreak, including 
recommendations on care of the sick and contact information for questions.  
 
Questions for Consideration: 
Can information be prepared in advance about key topics?  Can this be translated? 
Could the State health department or colleges and universities in the state provide 
this service? 
Is there one spokesperson in the community or are there different individuals who 
are more credible for different messages? If that or those individual(s) become ill, 
who will take their place? Are these key people trained in speaking to the press? 
What populations in the community may not be reached through traditional public 
information methods? What alternative ways could information be provided? Which 
organizations in the community could provide assistance?  
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 How will messages be kept consistent with others being distributed from other levels 
of government, other neighboring communities? How will rumors be dispelled? 
When and how does the jurisdiction wish to release information regarding delicate 
topics (e.g. the prioritization of scarce resources of either antivirals or vaccine, the 
need for isolation and quarantine, the growing number of dead)?  
If the jurisdiction might potentially implement isolation and/or quarantine orders, how 
might residents of the community react? How should the need for such orders be 
presented and discussed? 
Who develops information about home health care? What methods will convey the 
urgency of keeping individuals home unless meeting a certain threshold of 
symptoms that indicate need for medical care? Where will individuals be directed to 
go if they cannot use regular avenues for health care (primary physician not 
available, no primary physician)? 
How will rumors be dispelled? 
How will messages be kept consistent with others being distributed from other levels 
of government, other neighboring communities? 
How will the jurisdiction communicate about delicate topics, such as growing 
numbers of dead that may overwhelm the community’s day-to-day ability to process 
bodies? How will funeral homes and churches be engaged in this process? 
Is there one spokesperson in the community or are there different individuals who 
are more credible for different messages? If that or those individual(s) become ill, 
who will take their place? Are these key people trained in speaking to the press? 
What populations in the community may not be reached through traditional public 
information methods? What alternative ways could information be provided? Which 
organizations in the community could provide assistance?  
Can information prepared in advance be translated? Could the State health 
department or colleges and universities in the state provide this service? 
What information needs to be distributed to partners? How can the appropriate 
information help non-traditional parts of the community see the necessity for 
planning now for a pandemic? 
Tools and Resources: 
Links to several PowerPoint presentations on pandemic influenza are available here.  
Pandemic Influenza Communications Strategy from Dallas County, Texas, 
available at 
http://www.dallascounty.org/department/hhservices/services/publichealthalert/docu
ments/CommunicatingDuringaPandemic.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 Pocket Flu Guide created by Santa Clara County Public Health, available at 
http://www.naccho.org/topics/demonstration/APC/documents/YourPandemicGuide_
ENG-webversion.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 2006). The guide outlines what the 
public should know about pan flu. Designed to be carried by the average citizen, the 
colorful guide describes the distinctions between seasonal flu and pandemic flu; 
provides information on what to expect during a pandemic event; explains how to 
control the spread of disease in the home; describes how to obtain emergency 
broadcast information; lists emergency contact numbers and more- all in a 
publication that can be easily folded and carried in a wallet. 
Letters to parents of school-age children, developed by Seattle-King County 
Public Health (PHSKC), offered in customizable MSWord format in English, 
Chinese, Korean, Russian, Somali, Spanish, and Vietnamese, available at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/schools/index.htm (last accessed: 
July 18, 2006). 
Checklists for schools on the topics of mitigation, preparedness, response 
and recovery, developed by PHSKC, available in customizable MSWord format at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/schools/kc-schools-checklist.doc (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Pandemic Flu School Action Kit, developed by Contra Costa Health Services, 
California, that offers a range of items including parent letters and media materials, 
at http://cchealth.org/topics/pandemic_flu/school_action_kit/ (last accessed: July 18, 
2006). 
Family Health Information Sheet, developed by PHSKC, to help citizens collect 
vital health data on family members and contact information for family health 
providers in advance of a pandemic, available at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/prepare/familyhealth.pdf (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Household Flu Preparedness Checklist, developed by Santa Clara County Health 
Department, available at http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=325.  
Common Myths and Misconceptions Factsheet, developed by Dallas County, 
TX, available at 
http://www.dallascounty.org/department/hhservices/services/publichealthalert/docu
ments/CommonMythsandMisconceptions_000.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Bird Flu and You, a poster and a flyer available in 8 languages in addition to 
English (Chinese, French, German, Japanese, Portuguese, Spanish, Thai, and 
Vietnamese) that promotes concepts like covering coughs and sneezes, washing 
hands, and social distancing. Available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Bird_flu.htm 
(last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 Red Cross FAQ sheet on Pandemic Influenza available at 
http://www.bostonredcross.org/pandemic/PandemicFAQ.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 
2006). 
PowerPoint Briefing for Local Response Agencies developed by PHSKC, 
available at http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/multimedia/051806-
presentation.ppt (last accessed: July 18, 2006).  
Lee Colwell, “The Pandemic Influenza Plan: Implications for Local Law 
Enforcement” in Police Chief available at 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article
_id=784&issue_id=12006 (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Corrections Agency and IT Preparations for Pandemic Influenza, PowerPoint 
presentation by Scott McPherson, CIO, Florida Department of Corrections, available 
at http://www.correctionstech.org/2006Conference/presentations/Panflu.ppt (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006) 
Outreach letter to the business community, developed by PHSKC, available at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/apc/docs/business-engagement-letter.doc (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Example Flyer for Community Conference on Pandemic Influenza from 
Hamilton County, Ohio, available at 
http://www.hamiltoncountyhealth.org/pdfs/news/June2006/HCHD%20PanFlu%20Co
nference%20Flier%20Final.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Outreach letter to Non-Profits, Faith-Based and Community-based 
Organizations, from Dallas County, Texas Department of Health and Human 
Services, available at 
http://www.dallascounty.org/department/hhservices/services/publichealthalert/docu
ments/faithbase_and_community_based_organizations/Pandemic_Influenza_Faith-
Based_Letter.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 Issue Area: Clinical Guidelines and Disease Management
 
Description:  The ability to provide effective treatment and disease management for 
individuals who become infected with pandemic influenza is a critical capacity within 
a pandemic flu plan. This section includes giving healthcare providers within a 
jurisdiction sufficient information to diagnose cases of pandemic influenza infection, 
provide proper care for those cases, and dispense antivirals (if effective ones exist).  
If antivirals are effective against any novel form of influenza that causes a pandemic, 
providing information on those antivirals to healthcare partners and coordinating a 
jurisdictional plan for distribution of these medications will be crucial. Due to the fact 
that in a pandemic, any effective antivirals will be in limited supply, communities will 
need to develop priority groups to guide distribution. These policies should be made 
based upon guidance from CDC, State health agencies and community specifics. 
Finally, because healthcare facilities will be overwhelmed in the event of an 
influenza pandemic, provisions must be made to help the public determine whether 
home care may be the best option for sick family members and loved ones. 
Information on what care should be provided and what symptoms would indicate a 
need to try to obtain more advanced healthcare will be important to relieve the stress 
upon the healthcare system.   
Relevant Planning Assumptions (examples):
1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of infection with 
outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and the 
country may be impacted simultaneously. 
2. An influenza pandemic may occur in waves and last for 12 to 24 
months.  
3. Antiviral medications will be in extremely short supply. 
4. A vaccine for the pandemic influenza strain will likely not be available 
for 6 to 8 months following the emergence of a novel virus.   
5. The number of ill people requiring outpatient medical care and 
hospitalization will overwhelm the local health care system. In other 
words, the normal amount and level of hospital care will not be 
available.  
a. Infection control measures specific to management of influenza 
patients will need to be developed and implemented at health care 
facilities, out-patient care settings and long-term care facilities.  
  31 
 b. The demand for home care and social services will increase 
dramatically. 
Key Partners: Hospitals; Clinics; Clinicians; Home Health Care Providers; 
Pharmacies; Law Enforcement/Public Safety; Emergency Management; Community 
Facilities for Point of Distribution Use; Businesses 
Key Actions by Phase (examples): 
Many jurisdictions reference their existing mass dispensing plans when discussing 
distribution of antivirals during a pandemic, changing elements as necessary to fit 
the specific circumstances. 
Phases 1 through 3 
 Disseminate information to healthcare partners regarding: 
⇒ the clinical case definition of novel influenza infection in the alert period; 
⇒ evolving clinical case definitions and epidemiologic information as the 
pandemic progresses; 
⇒ reporting requirements, which may change from time to time as the 
pandemic unfolds; 
⇒ infection control standards for the home, outpatient clinic, and inpatient 
hospital settings; 
⇒ real-time updates regarding local clusters of disease in the early stages 
of the pandemic; 
⇒ clinical information regarding the evaluation and anticipated course of 
novel and pandemic influenza infections, based upon available 
information from CDC and WHO; 
⇒ information regarding availability and appropriate use of antiviral 
agents; 
⇒ information regarding availability and recommended use of strain-
specific influenza vaccine; and/or, 
⇒ any recommendations for alterations in standards of care, which may 
be necessitated as available healthcare resources become 
overwhelmed. 
 Develop plans for antiviral medications. 
 Review existing recommendations on priority groups. 
 Convene meeting with community partners to develop distribution plan. 
 Determine methods for acquiring medications  
 Arrange for security of antiviral medications once received. 
 Develop and disseminate guidelines for medical providers regarding 
antivirals, based upon: 
⇒ any guidance issued by the CDC, the WHO, and State health agency; 
⇒ evolving information on the efficacy of antiviral medications for 
treatment and prophylaxis of the pandemic strain;  
⇒ evolving information on those individuals who are most likely to 
experience serious complications from infection with the pandemic 
influenza strain; 
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 ⇒ changes in the supply of influenza antivirals; and/or 
⇒ availability of strain-specific influenza vaccine. 
 
Phase 4:  
 Provide healthcare partners with triage protocol to assess individuals 
presenting with ILI. 
 Develop public information messaging based on expected amounts of 
vaccine and priority groups. 
 
Phase 5: 
 Implement plans for requesting any available drugs through the Strategic 
National Stockpile. 
 Activate plans for monitoring adverse reactions to antiviral medications. 
 Distribute antivirals to priority groups, according to jurisdictional plan, CDC 
and State health department guidelines. 
 Reference existing mass dispensing plans as relevant, depending on supply. 
 Implement measures to monitor adverse reactions. 
 
Phase 6 
 Distribute antivirals to priority groups, according to CDC and State health 
department guidelines, while supply exists. 
 Monitor adverse reactions as resources permit. 
 Monitor any cases of resistance to antivirals 
 
Questions for Consideration: 
What modifications may need to be made to existing dispensing plans to adjust for 
pandemic flu conditions?  
Is contact information for all clinicians in the community updated and current? Are 
clinicians aware of who to call to answer questions or request additional information? 
If the jurisdiction’s supply of antivirals is not sufficient to supply all of even a single 
priority group, how will intra-group prioritizations be made? Will priority groups 
include first responders or essential services personnel? 
How will the jurisdiction provide security for stocks of antivirals? What if law 
enforcement/public safety has insufficient personnel either to do the jobs assigned to 
them or because of absenteeism because of the pandemic, how will these tasks be 
accomplished? How will they be prioritized? 
Tools and Resources: 
Clinical Algorithm for Case Management (Phases 3, 4 and 5) and Clinical 
Algorithm for Case Management (Phase 6), developed by Santa Clara County 
Health Department, available at  http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=326.  
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 Sample listing of priority groups for antivirals, taken from the PHSKC plan, 
available at http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/plan/Appendix-B.pdf (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Sample guidance on use of antivirals, addressing when there is no vaccine and 
changes to be made when a vaccine becomes available, developed by Santa Clara 
County Health Department, available at 
http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=327 (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Clinical Triage Guidelines during Pandemic, developed by Santa Clara County 
Health Department, available at http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=328 
(last accessed: July 18, 2006).  
How to Care for Someone with Influenza guide, developed by PHSKC, available 
at http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/prepare/prevention.pdf (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Fluids Suitable for Maintenance of Hydration and Management of Mild 
Dehydration for Influenza Patients in the Home Setting, developed by Santa 
Clara County Health Department, available at 
http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=329 (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Red Cross Information Sheet: Home Care for Pandemic Flu, available at 
http://www.bostonredcross.org/pandemic/Pandemichomecare.pdf (last accessed: 
July 18, 2006). 
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 Issue Area: Healthcare System Planning 
 
Description: The impact of an influenza pandemic upon the nation’s healthcare 
system will be overwhelming. As the majority of healthcare entities exist in the 
private sector and many times in competition, this aspect of planning can be 
challenging and time consuming for all parties involved.  
This section discusses healthcare system planning from the perspective of the 
jurisdiction, in terms of what planning needs and challenges may need to be 
addressed, and what technical assistance may be offered. It does not address in 
detail how healthcare entities should approach pandemic influenza planning within 
their facilities.   
Relevant Planning Assumptions (examples): 
1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of infection with 
outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and the 
country may be impacted simultaneously. 
2. Localities will not be able to rely on timely or effective mutual aid 
resources, State or Federal assistance to support local response 
efforts. 
3. An influenza pandemic may occur in waves and last for 12 to 24 
months. 
4. A vaccine for the pandemic influenza strain will likely not be available 
for 6 to 8 months following the emergence of a novel virus.  
5. The number of ill people requiring outpatient medical care and 
hospitalization will overwhelm the local health care system. In other 
words, the normal amount and level of hospital care will not be 
available.  
a. Hospitals and clinics will have to modify their operational 
structure to respond to high patient volumes and maintain 
functionality of critical systems.  
b. The health care system will have to respond to increased 
demands for service while the medical workforce experiences 
25-35% absenteeism due to illness or caring for ill family 
members.  
c. Demand for inpatient beds and assisted ventilators could 
increase by ten-fold or more and patients will need to be 
prioritized for services.  
  35 
 d. There will be tremendous demand for urgent care services.  
e. Infection control measures specific to management of influenza 
patients will need to be developed and implemented at health 
care facilities, out-patient care settings and long-term care 
facilities.  
f. The health system will need to develop alternative care sites to 
relieve demand on hospital emergency departments and care for 
persons not ill enough to merit hospitalization but who cannot be 
cared for at home.  
g. Emergency Medical Service responders will face extremely high 
call volumes, and may face 25% - 35% reduction in available 
staff.  
h. The number of fatalities will overwhelm the resources of the 
Medical Examiner’s Office, morgues and funeral homes.  
i. The demand for home care and social services will increase 
dramatically. 
 
Key Partners: All Healthcare Facilities, Clinicians, Pharmacies, Emergency 
Management, Emergency Medical Services, Medical Reserve Corps/Volunteer 
Groups, 911/Dispatch, Medical Societies 
Key Actions by Phase (examples): 
Phases 1 and 2:  
 Engage in community-wide planning: 
⇒ identify who is part of the healthcare system;  
⇒ determining capacity;  
⇒ establish MOUs; and/or 
⇒ recruit and maintain volunteers. 
 
Phases 3 through 5: 
 Convene an internal pandemic influenza planning task force to develop/revise 
a pandemic preparedness plan for the facility that includes: 
⇒ hospital use of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System 
(HEICS) for sustained continuity of hospital operations and patient care 
services; 
⇒ specific pandemic influenza planning strategies that incorporate current 
local, state and federal guidance; 
⇒ triggers for activating the facility’s internal pandemic emergency plan; 
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 ⇒ assignment of authority and responsibility for aspects of the pandemic 
plan and response within the facility; and/or 
⇒ patient triage systems. 
 Review and revise high patient census protocols specifically to prepare for the 
intensity and duration of patient influx during a pandemic influenza, including 
isolation capacity. 
 Develop plans for use of overflow space to triage, transfer/discharge, and 
treat patients, including use of suspended beds, converting outpatient space 
to inpatient, using nonpatient areas, and obtaining appropriate permission 
from State licensing entities to use these spaces in an emergency. 
 Identify critical staff roles including healthcare workers, housekeepers, dietary, 
laundry, plant operations, security, chaplains, mental health staff and 
management, and develop plans to cover these critical roles. 
 Develop standardized pandemic physician orders. 
 Develop streamlined nursing notes/patient care records. 
 Develop work force preservation protocols to minimize absenteeism, which 
may include: 
⇒ Establishing a staff hotline with current information. 
⇒ Providing sick-care services for children of hospital staff. 
⇒ Developing rosters of staff teams to allow for rotation and rest over the 
duration of the pandemic. 
 Develop and conduct staff training on the facility’s pandemic response plan. 
 Prepare to manage volunteer personnel, including: 
⇒ Granting emergency privileges; 
⇒ Establishing competency and monitoring staff performance for newly 
recruited and/or volunteer personnel; 
⇒ Assigning temporary personnel; 
⇒ Using retired and volunteer healthcare workers for some patient care 
roles; 
⇒ Using community volunteers for non-clinical roles such as transporting 
specimens, registration and supply handling; 
⇒ Training volunteers; and/or 
⇒ Develop just-in-time training and orientation modules for temporary and 
volunteer staff. 
 Inventory critical supplies needed for treatment of patients with pandemic 
influenza, including personal protective equipment (PPE): 
⇒ Determine usage levels and stockpile critical supplies. 
⇒ Develop memoranda of understanding with vendors for procuring 
additional supplies including masks, gloves, gowns, beds/cots, 
intravenous supplies, portable high efficiency particulate air filters, 
ventilators, etc. 
 Test systems for procuring and storing additional supplies and address 
rotational issues. 
 Repair durable equipment not currently in full working order on an expedited 
basis and shorten routine maintenance cycle. 
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  Ensure availability of recommended laboratory processing, testing and 
reporting of results to the ordering physician and infection control team. 
 Convene the infection control committee to review/revise infection control 
policies and procedures relevant to the pandemic response, including: 
⇒ containment strategies; 
⇒ respiratory hygiene; 
⇒ isolation; 
⇒ cohorting; 
⇒ workforce issues such as training, PPE and guidelines for “fitness for 
duty” status; and/or 
⇒ cleaning equipment/environment. 
 Adopt aggressive “respiratory hygiene” programs in all patient and visitor 
waiting areas to include signs about respiratory etiquette, hand cleaning 
supplies, tissues, masks, and waste receptacles; require all coughing patients 
to don a mask. 
 Plan for respiratory isolation 
⇒ Inventory respiratory isolation capacity and integrity of negative 
pressure isolation room systems. 
⇒ Develop strategies for expanding respiratory isolation capacity and 
cohorting infectious patients. 
 Plan for vaccination program 
⇒ Review current vaccination program for pneumonia and influenza to 
assure that employees have access to vaccinations. 
⇒ Develop procedures to identify high-risk patients for vaccine/antiviral 
distribution, according to any local or state guidelines. 
⇒ Identify critical hospital personnel for vaccination and antiviral 
medication; collaborate with jurisdictional planning team on allocation 
plan for vaccine and antivirals. 
 Train medical staff on treatment priorities, allocating limited resources, and 
“sufficiency of care” standard. 
 Develop systems for timely distribution of updated guidance to clinical staff, 
and revise policies and standard operating procedures accordingly. 
 Implement discharge for patients not requiring inpatient care. 
 Establish specific triage and waiting areas for individuals presenting with ILI 
 and those with risk for severe complications, such as pregnant women, and 
immunocompromised individuals. 
 
Phase 6: 
 Implement facility response plans. 
 Coordinate any public messaging with community partners. 
 
Questions for Consideration: 
Is there a system in the jurisdiction or in the state for tracking capacity and available 
beds? By type? For coordinating care? 
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 Will admission/discharge policies be modified? How will these changes be 
communicated to the public? 
What triggers will exist for canceling elective procedures? 
Are there any circumstances wherein a facility might need to close its doors? 
Will radiology and laboratory services be sufficient to meet demand? How will 
prioritization of these services be handled and when? 
How will facilities address degradation of care issues? What triggers exist to change 
nurse to patient ratios? Does facility policy consider of use of volunteers and/or 
patient family members? 
Are there any circumstances wherein the facility might need to close its doors? 
Will radiology and laboratory services be sufficient to meet demand? How will 
prioritization of these services be handled and when? 
How well do essential non-healthcare staff understand the crucial role they would 
play in a pandemic? (Facilities management, food preparation, janitorial staff) 
How will the jurisdiction deal with a surge in EMS calls, particularly in small 
jurisdictions? What criteria will be used to prioritize EMS calls?  
How will the jurisdiction communicate the strain of EMS services to public? What 
alternatives will be offered?  
Are there plans in place to increase security at hospitals/healthcare facilities? During 
a pandemic, are security staff or contractors dedicated to the facility or might they 
have other community roles? 
How will the facilities handle critical non-flu cases? How will facilities separate those 
not suffering from respiratory illness?  
What plans does the healthcare system have to manage financial burden of 
pandemic? As a the system experiences a decrease in elective surgeries, increased 
overtime, loss of regular staff, higher volumes of patients, how will facilities pay bills? 
How will facilities obtain additional supplies during a pandemic? Will facilities operate 
through a central entity, like the Emergency Operations Center in the jurisdiction?  
How will facilities handle a disruption in blood supply? 
What plans does the healthcare system have to manage financial burden of 
pandemic?  
Tools and Resources: 
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 FluAid Software: “is designed to assist state and local level planners in preparing 
for the next influenza pandemic by providing estimates of potential impact specific to 
their locality. FluAid provides only a range of estimates of impact in terms of deaths, 
hospitalizations, and outpatients visits due to pandemic influenza. The software 
cannot describe when or how people will become ill, or how a pandemic may spread 
through a society over time.” (From the CDC website.) 
FluSurge Spreadsheet and User’s Manual: A spreadsheet tool that allows users 
to generate a number of hospitalizations and deaths that could be expected over the 
period of a pandemic, based upon certain assumptions and data entered by the user 
about their jurisdiction (population, staffed hospital beds, ICU beds, number of 
ventilators). (Coordinates with Flu Aid, above). 
Avian (Bird) Flu Preparation and Response Brochure, developed by the EMS 
Section of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, available at 
http://www.iafc.org/associations/4685/files/birdflu_broch.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 
2006). 
Emergency Management (EM) Principles and Practices for Healthcare 
Systems, from the Veterans Health Administration, available at: 
http://www1.va.gov/emshg/page.cfm?pg=122 (last accessed: July 18, 2006).  
Clinical Triage Guidelines during Pandemic, developed by Santa Clara County 
Health Department, available at http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=328 
(last accessed: July 18, 2006).  
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 Issue Area: Limiting the Spread of Disease
 
Description: Preventing a novel strain of influenza from spreading once it has 
entered the community will be difficult. A number of different approaches, including 
adherence to infection control measures, non-medical interventions such as isolation 
and quarantine, social distancing and restriction of travel, as well as provision of 
vaccine, once available, can reduce if not prevent the spread of the disease within 
the community. Quarantine and Isolation (Q&I) measures are often referenced in 
this section. Frequently, local pandemic influenza plans reference existing 
jurisdictional emergency plans that outline the process for implementing Q&I, only 
addressing those aspects of planning specific to pandemic influenza. Other plans go 
into complete detail regarding authorities and processes to be implemented.  
 
Relevant Planning Assumptions (examples): 
1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of infection with 
outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and the 
country may be impacted simultaneously. 
2. An influenza pandemic may occur in waves and last for 12 to 24 
months. 
3. Residents will be required to stay in their homes for a significant period 
during an influenza pandemic; thus, residents will need public 
information, education and tools so they are prepared to take 
responsibility for basic needs (food, water, prescription meds, over-the-
counter medications, etc.). 
4. Antiviral medications will be in extremely short supply. 
5. A vaccine for the pandemic influenza strain will likely not be available 
for 6 to 8 months following the emergence of a novel virus.  
6. Social distancing strategies aimed at reducing the spread of infection 
such as closing schools, community centers, and other public 
gathering points and canceling public events will likely be implemented 
during a pandemic.  
7. Residents will be required to stay in their homes for a significant period 
during an influenza pandemic; thus, residents will need public 
information, education and tools so they are prepared to take 
responsibility for basic needs (food, water, prescription meds, over-the-
counter medications, etc.). 
8.  Isolations and quarantine restrictions will likely be imposed. 
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 9. Some persons will be unable or unwilling to comply with isolation 
directives. For others, social distancing strategies may be less feasible 
populations who live in congregate settings. It will be important to 
develop and disseminate strategies for infection control appropriate for 
these environments and populations. 
10. Risk Communication will be critically important during all phases of 
planning and implementation of a pandemic influenza response. The 
general public, health care system, response agencies, and elected 
leaders will need continuous updates on the status of the pandemic 
outbreak, impacts on critical services, the steps being taken to address 
the incident, and steps the public can take to protect themselves. 
Key Partners: Hospitals; Clinicians; Emergency Management; Mayor’s Office; 
Media; Law Enforcement; Schools; Long Term Care Facilities; Correctional 
Facilities; Businesses; Volunteer Groups; Home Healthcare Services; 
Transportation Entities 
 
Key Actions by Phase (examples): 
Quarantine and Isolation (Q&I) measures are often referenced in this section. 
Frequently, local pandemic influenza plans reference existing jurisdictional 
emergency plans that outline the process for implementing Q&I, only addressing 
those aspects of planning specific to pandemic influenza. Other plans go into 
complete detail regarding authorities and processes to be implemented.  
Phase 3: 
 Conduct broad public education campaign about influenza pandemics and 
the possible necessity to use quarantine and isolation measures to prevent 
the spread of the virus. 
 Coordinate planning with relevant community partners, including, but not 
limited to law enforcement, home health services and the Red Cross. 
 Work with infection control professionals at local healthcare facilities to 
promote the use of practices that will prevent the spread of the virus. 
 Coordinate with community service agencies and organizations to establish 
plans that provide food, medicine and other necessities to households placed 
in quarantine or providing home health care to infected individuals. 
 Enhance coverage with vaccinations for seasonal influenza in groups at risk 
for severe influenza and in healthcare workers. 
 Enhance coverage with vaccines against Streptococcus pneumoniae among 
those for whom these vaccines are recommended. 
 Estimate the size of priority groups to be vaccinated. 
 Develop a plan for identification of persons in priority groups at vaccination 
clinics. 
 Refine plans for procurement and distribution of vaccine. 
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  Develop a procedure to inform vaccine recipients about the need for a second 
dose, to track recipients and possibly to call them back for the second dose 
when vaccine supplies allow. 
 
Phase 4: 
 Work with CDC Quarantine Stations at jurisdiction ports of entry regarding 
management of passengers requiring isolation, quarantine or follow-up. 
 Notify physicians and clinics to immediately report influenza-like illness in 
individuals arriving from or recently returned from specified regions. 
 Isolate individuals suspected (or confirmed) to be infected with new influenza 
strain at home or in an available healthcare facility (if needed) for at least 
seven days after onset of illness, unless proven not to be new strain. 
Quarantine contacts of individuals for seven days as well. 
 
Phase 5:  
 Recommend that facilities with less mobile or immobile populations (long term 
care facilities, nursing homes, prisons) restrict access in order to prevent 
exposure. 
 Provide technical assistance regarding management of healthcare workers 
who become infected with the new influenza strain. 
 
Phase 6: 
 Implement public health restrictions including curtailing travel; imposing 
curfews; closing of schools/churches/theaters/community centers/malls; 
canceling of public gatherings, with possible enforcement by law enforcement. 
 Limit provision of health care services to patients with urgent and emergent 
health problems. 
 Monitor effectiveness of social distancing strategies in controlling the spread 
of disease. 
 Review national recommendations regarding pandemic influenza vaccination 
and develop modifications or refinements to priority groups, as appropriate  
 When vaccine is available, modify plans for distribution based on: 
⇒ amount of vaccine available; 
⇒ identity and location of priority groups to be targeted for vaccination; 
⇒ availability of private and public entities to stage influenza vaccine 
clinics, as well as their ability to handle the necessary security needs 
and to follow health officer directives; and/or 
⇒ degree to which potential drop-off sites may already be overwhelmed 
by the demands of pandemic response. 
 Review national recommendations regarding pandemic influenza vaccination 
and develop modifications or refinements to priority groups, as appropriate. 
 Communicate the rationale for prioritization of selected groups for vaccination 
clearly to healthcare providers and to the general public. 
 Rapidly provide training in vaccination and data collection for public health 
staff and other partners responsible for vaccinating priority groups. 
 Monitor vaccine supplies, distribution and use. 
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  Track recipients of influenza vaccine using the Immunization Registry, and 
calling back vaccine recipients for a second dose, as feasible. 
 Monitor and investigate adverse events following vaccination, as feasible. 
 After priority groups have been vaccinated and additional stocks of vaccine 
become available, work to ensure fair, orderly, and equitable distribution of 
vaccine to the rest of the population. 
 
Questions for Consideration: 
Will quarantine and isolation orders be voluntary or enforced?  
What are the triggers for closing schools and canceling public gatherings? What 
advice given about staying home? How will the jurisdiction cope with effects on 
workforce? 
What is the role of law enforcement/public safety in providing security for mass 
vaccination clinics? How will vaccine be secured?  
If law enforcement/public safety has insufficient personnel, either to do the jobs 
assigned to them or because of absenteeism because of the pandemic, how will 
these tasks be accomplished? How will they be prioritized? 
Will the jurisdiction consider recruitment of those who have recovered from the flu to 
assist in staffing vaccination clinics? 
Tools and Resources: 
Sample listing of priority groups for influenza vaccination, taken from the 
PHSKC plan, available at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/plan/Appendix-A.pdf (last accessed: 
July 18, 2006).  
“Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic: Vaccine Prioritization” in Family Practice 
Management on Medscape at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/521509 (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Plan for Vaccination with Strain-specific Influenza Vaccine During an Influenza 
Pandemic, developed by Santa Clara County Health Department, available at 
http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=330 (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Disease Control Measures: Definitions, Examples and Considerations, 
developed by Santa Clara County Health Department, available at 
http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=331 (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Protective Measures to Reduce the Spread of Pandemic Influenza, appendix 
from the PHSKC plan, available at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/plan/Appendix-D1.pdf (last accessed: 
July 18, 2006). 
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 Sample Quarantine Order and Home Isolation Order, developed by Santa Clara 
County Health Department, available at: 
http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=332 (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Sample Home Isolation Checklist, developed by Santa Clara County Health 
Department, available at http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=334 (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Sample Temporary Isolation Order, developed by Santa Clara County Health 
Department, available at http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=335 (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Sample Alert to Law Enforcement regarding Isolation and Quarantine Orders, 
developed by Santa Clara County Health Department, available at 
http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=333 (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Charles Friend, “Quarantines: The Law Enforcement Role” in Police Chief 
available at 
http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=8
07&issue_id=22006 (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Graded Implementation of Social Distancing Measures, appendix from the 
PHSKC plan, available at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/plan/Appendix-D2.pdf (last accessed: 
July 18, 2006). 
Threshold Determinants for the Use of Social Distancing Measures, appendix 
from the PHSKC plan, available at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/plan/Appendix-F.pdf (last accessed: 
July 18, 2006). 
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 Issue Area: Mortuary Services & Mass Fatality Management 
 
Description:  Planning for the incredible number of deaths that have been predicted 
to result from an influenza pandemic is a challenge at all levels of government. Even 
the recent national response plan released by the federal government gives only 
short coverage to the topic.17 This section gives a basic overview to consideration in 
this planning effort and should relate to a jurisdiction’s existing mass fatality plan. 18
Relevant Planning Assumptions (examples): 
1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of infection with 
outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and the 
country may be impacted simultaneously.  
2. Localities will not be able to rely on timely or effective mutual aid 
resources, State or Federal assistance to support local response 
efforts. 
3. The number of fatalities will overwhelm the resources of the Medical 
Examiner’s Office, morgues and funeral homes. 
Key Partners: Healthcare Facilities/Providers; Emergency Medical Services; 
Medical Examiner/Coroner’s Office; Emergency Management; Funeral Homes and 
Mortuaries; Cemeteries  
Key Actions by Phase (examples): 
Phases 3 through 5: 
 As additional information about the specifics of a pandemic become available, 
review jurisdictional mass fatality plans against mortality estimates and 
identify any areas requiring additional focus. 
 
Phase 6:  
 Based on how a pandemic impacts the jurisdiction, implement adjustments to 
regular processes such as the following:  
⇒ Identification and documentation of victims 
⇒ Activation and management of temporary temperature 
⇒ Controlled holding facilities 
⇒ Release of remains to family members 
⇒ Temporary internment of mass fatalities 
                                                                          
17
 Ceci Connelly, “A Grisly but Essential Issue: Pandemic Plan Skims Over How to Deal With Many Corpses,” 
Washington Post, June 9, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060900078.html (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
18
 Special thanks to San Mateo County Health Department, California, whose plan provided the basis for much of 
this section. 
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 ⇒ Cremation and burial of mass fatalities 
 Following declaration of a state of emergency, the Health Officer will issue an 
order to the Coroner to abbreviate the regulations in the processing of people 
who have expired without a doctor in attendance for 20 days preceding death 
or without a diagnosis. If, in the opinion of the Coroner, a person appears to 
have died from influenza, no autopsy is needed. 
 Safeguards must be in place to ensure the protection of all personnel 
handling deceased individuals who have succumbed to contagious influenza. 
It is recommended that face shields be worn to prevent accidental eye contact 
with airborne droplets of sputum or excreta. A standard surgical mask should 
be worn to prevent the inhalation of the same. 
 The Coroner’s department will continue to supply the Health Department with 
statistics regarding morbidity activity. During a pandemic influenza event, it is 
important that the Health Officer receive data that indicate geographic and 
community mortality rates. 
 
Questions for Consideration: 
How will necessary supplies be obtained for mass fatality management? 
Can bodies be managed safely for a time until jurisdiction is able to process them? 
Are there alternative sites in addition to morgues and funeral homes that have the 
capacity to be utilized for this purpose? 
Where will additional staff to assist with fatality management be drawn from?  
What guidance is given to individuals working with bodies to allow them to feel 
protected from infection? 
What restrictions exist on mass internment within the jurisdiction?  
Are there any existing legal requirements for autopsies or other processes (such as 
deaths at home)? What triggers would be used to indicate a need to change those 
requirements? Can these requirements be waived? 
How will concerns regarding religious beliefs be addressed? How will the jurisdiction 
communicate any inability to provide usual level of care and speed during a 
pandemic to the bereaved? 
How will memorial services be conducted in order to minimize potential spread of 
disease among attendees? 
Tools and Resources: 
Guidelines for the Management of Mass Fatalities During an Influenza 
Pandemic, Appendix to Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan, available at 
http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/pdf-cpip-03/cpip-appendix-i.pdf (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 Management of Dead Bodies after Disasters: A Field Manual for First 
Responders from the Pan American Health Organization, available at 
http://www.paho.org/english/dd/ped/DeadBodiesFieldManual.htm (last accessed: 
July 18, 2006). 
Providing Relief to Families After a Mass Fatality: Roles of the Medical 
Examiner’s Office and the Family Assistance Center, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/prfmf_11_2001/188912.pdf (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Handling of Disaster Victim Human Remains: A Quick Guide for Health Care 
Workers, Medical Examiners, and Funeral Services, from the Florida Department 
of Health addressing the technical, legal, and medical aspects of mass fatality 
remains handling, available at: 
https://www.femors.org/ssl/docs/FEMORS_Handling_of_Disaster_Victim_Human_R
emains.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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 Issue Area: Workforce Management and Support 
 
Description: Estimates of the percentage of the overall workforce that could be 
impacted at any given time by an influenza pandemic range from 15 to 40 percent, 
affecting every sector of the economy. Likewise, an emergency on the scale of an 
influenza pandemic will have an inevitable psychosocial impact not only on the 
individuals tasked with directly responding to the outbreak, but the broader 
population as well. The stresses placed on the workforce by illness-induced 
absenteeism, the long term nature of the emergency, and the mental health 
consequences will need to be factored into the planning of any local jurisdiction.  
 
Relevant Planning Assumptions (examples): 
1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of infection with 
outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and the 
country may be impacted simultaneously.  
2. Localities will not be able to rely on timely or effective mutual aid 
resources, State or Federal assistance to support local response 
efforts. 
3. Antiviral medications will be in extremely short supply. 
4. A vaccine for the pandemic influenza strain will likely not be available 
for 6 to 8 months following the emergence of a novel virus. 
5. The health care system will have to respond to increased demands for 
service while the medical workforce experiences 25-35% absenteeism 
due to illness or caring for ill family members. 
6. Emergency Medical Service responders will face extremely high call 
volumes, and may face 25% - 35% reduction in available staff.  
Key Partners: Mental Health Providers, American Red Cross, Volunteer Groups, 
Churches/Faith-based Organizations, Medical Reserve Corps, Medical 
Associations, Schools of Medicine, Schools of Nursing, Schools of Public Health, 
Childcare Centers, Service Organizations. Hospitals, Community Health Centers, 
Private Physicians, Businesses 
Key Actions by Phase (examples): 
Phases 3 through 5: 
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 Keeping workers at work: 
 Work with public and private industry to discuss how employees will be 
supported if services such as home health care or child care are unavailable 
during a pandemic in order to ensure continued attendance at work. 
 Identify and recruit potential volunteers to augment various areas during a 
pandemic. 
 Develop just-in-time training materials to train volunteers in key tasks 
during a pandemic. 
 
Addressing mental health issues: 
 Ensure that administrators, managers, and supervisors are familiar with 
and actively encourage the use of tools and techniques for supporting staff 
and their families during times of crisis.  
 Train staff (e.g., social workers, psychiatrists, nurses, psychologists, 
counselors) in behavioral techniques to help employees cope with grief, 
stress, exhaustion, anger, and fear during an emergency.  
 Provide training in psychological support services to persons who are not 
behavioral health professionals (e.g., primary-care clinicians, emergency 
department staff, medical/surgical staff, safety and security personnel, 
behavioral health staff, chaplains, community leaders, and staff of cultural 
and faith-based organizations).  
 Identify additional resources that can be available to employees and their 
families during and after a pandemic.  
 Develop strategies to assist staff who have childcare or elder-care 
responsibilities or other special needs that might affect their ability to work 
during a pandemic.  
 Identify and recruit potential volunteers to augment various areas during a 
pandemic. 
 Develop just-in-time training materials to train volunteers in key tasks 
during a pandemic. 
 Provide program administrators and counselors with information on: 
⇒ cognitive, physiological, behavioral, and emotional symptoms that 
might be exhibited by patients and their families (especially 
children), including symptoms that might indicate severe mental 
disturbance. 
⇒ self-care in the field (i.e., actions to safeguard physical and 
emotional health and maintain a sense of control and self-efficacy). 
⇒ cultural (e.g., professional, educational, geographic, ethnic) 
differences that can affect communication. 
⇒ potential impact of a pandemic on special populations (e.g., 
children, ethnic or cultural groups, the elderly). 
 
 Phase 6: 
 Activate psychosocial workforce support plans in jurisdiction. 
 Implement plans to provide support care with community partners to essential 
personnel that are responsible for dependent family members.  
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 Questions for Consideration: 
In a time of scarce resources, how can a jurisdiction prioritize psychosocial care for 
the community? Are these efforts considered “essential services”? 
What is the role of voluntary and faith-based organizations in providing both surge 
staffing and/or psychosocial support during a pandemic? 
Tools and Resources: 
Mental Health and Behavioral Guidelines to a Pandemic Flu Outbreak: 
Background on the Mental Health Impact of Natural Disasters, including 
Epidemics, from the Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress, available at 
http://www.centerforthestudyoftraumaticstress.org/downloads/CSTS_Pandemic_flu.
pdf (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Handout Materials about Coping, taken from the San Mateo, California pandemic 
influenza plan, available at http://www.naccho.org/equiph/detail.cfm?id=336 (last 
accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Brochure on Emotional Health Issues for Disaster Workers on Assignment, 
from Smithers, British Columbia, available at 
http://www.town.smithers.bc.ca/pdfs/fire/coping.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Coping with Disaster, webpage at City and County of Denver, 
http://www.denvergov.org/DEHEP/template116113.asp (last accessed: July 18, 
2006). 
When Disaster Strikes: Managing Mental Health in the Workplace, from the 
National Partnership for Workplace Mental Health, available at 
http://www.workplacementalhealth.org/toolsandresources/APA_brochure_Aug02.pdf 
(last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Disaster Psychiatry Handbook from the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Committee on Psychiatric Dimensions of Disaster, available at 
http://www.psych.org/disasterpsych/pdfs/apadisasterhandbk.pdf (last accessed: July 
18, 2006). 
Information for Relief Workers on Emotional Reactions to Human Bodies in 
Mass Death from the Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress, available at 
http://www.psych.org/disasterpsych/links/Info4ReliefWkrnew.pdf (last accessed: July 
18, 2006). 
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 Issue Area: Maintenance of Essential Services 
 
Description: Unlike many other types of disasters, an influenza pandemic’s 
consequences will span beyond those immediately affected by illness to almost all 
members of society, due to the disruption of all parts of daily life that will be affected 
because of the necessity of implementing social distancing measures and the 
impact on the workforce. All sectors will be stretched to their limits during a 
pandemic, and therefore plans to maintain those that are essential to the health and 
safety of the jurisdiction must be a part of any influenza planning process. 
Relevant Planning Assumptions (examples): 
1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of infection with 
outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and 
the country may be impacted simultaneously. 
2. Localities will not be able to rely on timely or effective mutual aid 
resources, State or Federal assistance to support local response 
efforts.   
3. An influenza pandemic may occur in waves and last for 12 to 24 
months. 
4. Residents will be required to stay in their homes for a significant 
period during an influenza pandemic; thus, residents will need 
public information, education and tools so they are prepared to take 
responsibility for basic needs (food, water, prescription meds, over-
the-counter medications, etc.). 
5. There will likely be significant disruption of public and privately 
owned critical infrastructure including transportation, commerce, 
utilities, public safety and communications.  
6. Social distancing strategies aimed at reducing the spread of 
infection such as closing schools, community centers, and other 
public gathering points and canceling public events will likely be 
implemented during a pandemic.  
7. Risk Communication will be critically important during all phases of 
planning and implementation of a pandemic influenza response. 
The general public, health care system, response agencies, and 
elected leaders will need continuous updates on the status of the 
pandemic outbreak, impacts on critical services, the steps being 
taken to address the incident, and steps the public can take to 
protect themselves. 
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 Key Partners: Mayor’s Office; County Board/City Council; Law Enforcement; Fire 
Service; Emergency Medical Services; Utilities; Transportation Services; Social 
Services 
Key Actions by Phase (examples): 
Phases 3 through 5: 
 Define essential services in the jurisdiction.19  
 Assign plan development to appropriate staff that will have access to decision 
makers in the organization. Delineate accountability, responsibility, 
capabilities and resources for key stakeholders engaged in planning and 
executing specific components of the operational plan. 
 Review and revise existing contingency plans specifically for a pandemic. 
 Examine whether core/essential business activities can be sustained over 
several weeks with the anticipated high absenteeism rates for prolonged 
periods of time. 
 Plan for potential interruptions of essential government functions, like 
sanitation, water, and power, and disruptions to the food supply. 
 Develop a list of personnel employed in these essential services whose 
absence would impair a response or daily operation of essential services and 
identify how their job responsibilities would be addressed in the event of 
absenteeism.  
 Identify essential functions and the staff who perform them. 
⇒ If these individuals are absent, identify staffing and training/redundancy 
assuming absentee rates of 25-35% at any given time. 
⇒ Identify policy changes and/or other infrastructure, or tools, needed for 
alternative work schedules, worksites, and service delivery options. 
 Enable employees to work from home with appropriate security and network 
access applications. 
 Expand self-service options for customers and business partners. 
 Establish Mandatory “work at home if sick with flu” policy. Establish policies 
for employee compensation unique to a pandemic. 
 Update sick leave and family and medical leave policies to allow for staffing 
away from the workplace if an employee is ill with the flu, and/or needs to care 
for ill family member. 
 Develop policy for curtailing business travel to and from affected areas. 
                                                                          
19
 Santa Clara Public Health defines “essential services” as meeting one or more of the following criteria: 
 Have increased demand placed on them during a pandemic to fulfill basic necessities and social needs 
 Directly support reduction in deaths and hospitalizations 
 Function in healthcare sector or emergency services. 
In that community, entities fitting that description have been identified as EMS provider organizations, fire service 
agencies, food suppliers (non-restaurant), key government agencies, law enforcement agencies, media 
organizations, mortuary services, public health services, public transportation services, and utility services.  See 
page 221 of their plan at 
http://www.sccgov.org/SCC/docs%2FPublic%20Health%20Department%20%28DEP%29%2Fattachments%2FPanFl
uPlan_SCC.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
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  Possible education on personal hygiene protection when traveling, if 
necessary. 
 Determine which outside activities are critical to maintaining operations and 
develop alternatives in case they cannot function normally. Identify essential 
business inventory that needs to be built up as a resource to allow for 
continuation of business operations. 
 Work with infection control professionals at local healthcare facilities to 
promote the use of practices that will prevent the spread of the virus. 
 Assign plan development to appropriate staff that will have access to decision 
makers in the organization. Delineate accountability, responsibility, 
capabilities and resources for key stakeholders engaged in planning and 
executing specific components of the operational plan. 
 Review and revise existing contingency plans specifically for a pandemic. 
 Examine whether core/essential business activities can be sustained over 
several weeks with the anticipated high absenteeism rates for prolonged 
periods of time. 
 Plan for potential interruptions of essential government functions, like 
sanitation, water, and power, and disruptions to the food supply. 
 Conduct education campaign for employees to encourage preparedness and 
protection of employee health and safety. 
 Promote a healthy worksite through encouragement of practices such as 
getting seasonal flu vaccinations and providing resources for good hand 
hygiene. 
 Communicate to employees what workplace policy changes will occur during 
a pandemic, according to predetermined plans. 
 Monitor flu like illness and overall related absenteeism and follow public 
health guidance in establishing social distancing measures if necessary. 
Phase 6: 
 Implement contingency plan. 
 Reinforce operational policy changes. 
 Enforce and monitor mandatory “stay at home if sick” policy. Promptly exclude 
staff or customers with influenza symptoms from the workplace. 
 Implement  healthy work environment: 
⇒ Modify the frequency and type of face-to-face contact among 
employees and between employees and customers. 
⇒ Evaluate employee access and availability of health care services. 
⇒ Evaluate employee access to availability of mental health and social 
services. 
 Monitor flu like illness and overall related absenteeism and follow public 
health guidance in establishing social distancing measures if necessary. 
Questions for Consideration: 
How are “essential services” defined in the jurisdiction? Are owners of such services 
which exist in the private sector aware of their role in a pandemic event? How can 
these private entities be engaged?  
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 To what extent have continuity of operations plans been completed for government 
agencies within the jurisdiction? What guidance can be provided? 
To what extent have continuity of operations plans been completed for businesses 
within the jurisdiction that provide vital services? What guidance can be provided? 
Tools and Resources: 
Continuity of government issues that should be addressed by local agencies 
guidance/checklist, developed by PHSKC, available at 
http://www.metrokc.gov/HEALTH/pandemicflu/gov/cog.pdf (last accessed: July 18, 
2006). 
Webcast on Maintaining Business Continuity after a Disaster, originally 
broadcast by the Northwest Center for Public Health Practice on December 20, 
2005, available at http://www.nwcphp.org/training/hot-topics/2005-hot-
topics/maintaining-business-continuity-after-a-public-health-disaster. This recorded 
webcast compares and contrasts recovery and business continuity between cities 
that have experienced major disasters. The naturally occurring public health 
emergencies of SARS in Toronto and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans highlight 
the significance of business continuity following major disasters. The presentation 
focuses on lessons learned and reinforces the need for public health to think about 
the role of business, large and small, and offer suggestions for establishing 
cooperative working arrangements between the sectors in order to support a 
successful recovery process. 
Example of Continuity of Operations Plan for an Influenza Pandemic, developed 
by the Metropolitan King County Council, Seattle, Washington, available at 
http://mkcclegisearch.metrokc.gov/attachments/20144.doc (last accessed: July 18, 
2006). 
Online list of resources about business emergency planning at 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/prepared/ (last accessed: July 18, 2006). 
Pandemic influenza materials from the Business Continuity Planners 
Association, Minnesota, available at 
http://www.bcpa.org/metadot/index.pl?iid=3568&isa=Category (last accessed: July 
18, 2006).  
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